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twenty-first century. In 1991 she and Pasko Rakic
founded the journal Cerebral Cortex. As the chief coedi-
tors, they made that journal into the premier publication
for basic cortical research.
Patricia Goldman-Rakic received numerous honors
and awards. She was elected president of the Society for
Neuroscience in 1989; she was elected to the National
Academy of Sciences (U.S.) in 1990, the American Acad-
emy of Arts and Sciences in 1991, and the Institute of
Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences in 1994.
She received France’s Fyssen Prize in Neuroscience in
1990, the Merit Award of NIMH in 1990, the Lieber
Award for the National Alliance for Research on Schizo-
phrenia and Depression in 1991, the Karl Lashley Award
of the American Philosophical Society in 1996, the Ralph
Gerard Award of the Society for Neuroscience in 2002,
and the Gold Medal for Distinguished Scientific Contri-
butions from the American Psychological Association. She
was awarded a doctor honoris causa from the University of
Utrecht in 2000 and an honorary degree from St.
Andrews College of the University of Edinburgh in 2003,
just a few months before her death.
Goldman-Rakic died at the age of sixty-six on 31 July
2003 from injuries sustained when a car struck her as she
was crossing a street in Hamden, Connecticut. At the time
of her death, she held appointments at Yale as professor in
the Departments of Neurobiology, Psychiatry, Neurology,
and Psychology. She was struck down at the pinnacle of
her career and died one of the most innovative and dedi-
cated neuroscientists in the modern era of brain research.
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GOODMAN, NELSON HENRY (b.
Somerville, Massachusetts, 7 August 1906; d. Needham,
Massachusetts, 25 November 1998), theory of induction
and confirmation, logic, scientific methodology, aesthetics,
metaphysics.
Goldman-Rakic Goodman
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Goodman is most famous for his discovery of the new
riddle of induction and its consequences for the theory of
induction. His famous grue-bleen example shows that con-
textual and pragmatic factors are crucial for the validity of
inductive and counterfactual arguments, because their
compellingness varies with the selection of predicates and
rules for their application by competent judges. Good-
man’s second groundbreaking methodological contribu-
tion to the inductive sciences is the proposal to model
inductive and counterfactual inferences as the partly infor-
mal process of producing a coherent whole in “reflective
equilibrium.” Goodman’s work decisively shifted the atten-
tion of theorists of induction away from mathematical for-
malisms (like the probability calculus) toward the
pragmatic conditions of nondeductive reasoning.
Biographical Sketch, Wider Influence. Goodman was
educated at Harvard University (BSc 1928), and obtained
his PhD there in 1941 with a groundbreaking dissertation
that was later published as A Study of Qualities. From
1929 to 1941 he was director of the Walker-Goodman
Art Gallery (Boston), and he performed military service
from 1942 to 1945. Goodman taught at Tufts College,
the University of Pennsylvania, and Brandeis University
before becoming professor of philosophy at Harvard Uni-
versity (1968–1977). Goodman’s work displays a remark-
able unity of thought, starting out from the early
nominalist constructionism in his The Structure of Appear-
ance (1951), through the studies in general symbol theory
in his Languages of Art (1968; largely focused on aesthet-
ics), until the late metaphysics of “worldmaking” in Ways
of Worldmaking (1978), which propounds a radically plu-
ralist form of constructivism (“irrealism”). Whereas the
latter aspects of his work in aesthetics and metaphysics
earned him wide popularity even outside philosophical
circles, it is often overlooked that they are firmly rooted in
his earlier studies of foundational problems in the
methodology of the inductive sciences. Most famous
among these are his new riddle of induction and his study
of counterfactual conditionals.
The Problem of Projectibility. In Fact, Fiction, and Fore-
cast (1955, chaps. 1 and 3), Goodman elaborated earlier
reflections on the conditions for evaluating inductive
inferences and counterfactual conditionals. Regarding the
former, he discovered the new riddle of induction by mak-
ing the following observation. Suppose all emeralds exam-
ined so far have been found green, and that there are still
some to be discovered, and consider the question whether
our knowledge is evidence for the hypothesis that the
next, or all emeralds without regard to when they were
found, are green. We usually think that it is, tacitly rely-
ing on an inference licensing principle like (U): “When-
ever some Fs have been observed to be Gs in n% of the
cases, then inferring that n% of the remaining Fs are G is
admissible.”
Goodman’s new riddle showed that such general
principles allow too many hypotheses to be equally well
supported by the evidence. To show this, he stipulated
that something is grue if it either has been observed until
some time t and been found green, or blue otherwise.
Clearly, the principle licenses reasoning from the eviden-
tial fact that (by definition) all emeralds observed so far
were (since green before t) grue, to the conclusion that the
remaining emeralds are grue as well. However, accepting
this generalization commits us to expecting emeralds
observed after t to be (grue, hence) blue, whereas the orig-
inal hypothesis commits us to expecting the same emer-
alds to be green. If the evidence is described in these
terms, it seems that our knowledge about green emeralds
supports something equivalent to the hypothesis that not
all emeralds are green just as much as it supports the rival
thesis that all emeralds are green, when the evidence is
described in familiar terms. It just seems obvious that the
grue hypothesis is not supported at all by our knowledge,
but given the example, it becomes unclear why we ought
to think this.
The new riddle of induction is to say why some reg-
ularities work (i.e., are lawlike or confirmable by their
instances) while other, formally analogous ones do not.
Goodman’s answer was to connect inductive validity and
the acceptance of predicate systems. Predicates are expres-
sions for the attribution of properties to particular objects,
and predicate systems are sets of predicates that are inter-
related in systematic ways. For example, color terms are
predicates that are true of objects if they have a certain
color. Color terms become a system by rules such as “If a
given color predicate applies to a uniformly colored
object, then no other color predicate applies to it,” which
regulate the application of all color terms by relating them
to one another in this way, predicate systems afford classi-
fications of objects. Goodman’s “grue” calls attention to
the fact that our expectations of inductive validity may
vary with the ways we classify objects, and so with the
kinds of systems of predicates that we apply to a given
range of particulars. He calls predicate systems that yield
descriptions of experiential input and permit inductive
inferences regarding generalizations in ways analogous to
principle (U) projectible and comes to the following
result: normal inductive methods (i.e., those that allow
learning from experience or supporting generalizations by
instances) yield adequate results only when the evidence
and hypotheses are formulated in projectible predicates.
By thus underscoring the inseparability of conceptualiza-
tion and generalization, Goodman’s new riddle challenges
methodologists who wish to formulate purely general
rules of inductive inference to say what it takes for a given
predicate within a given set of alternatives (and empirical
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statements) to be projectible. Without a general answer to
this question, unconstrained inductive methods that allow
the projection of any regularity from given evidence will
always also allow the projection of grue-like regularities.
The concomitant incoherencies, however, make it diffi-
cult to avoid that such methods will ultimately license any
arbitrary hypothesis on any given evidence.
The main difficulty for finding a general and inform-
ative account of projectibility is that it concerns nonfor-
mal properties of predicates, but also cannot project traits
of known successful predicates to a larger class of predi-
cates, since this assumes the legitimacy of the very kind of
inference it is supposed to ground. Goodman himself
therefore did not believe that there is a general, noncircu-
lar account of projectibility. While this leaves dim hopes
for a global “justification” of all inductive inferences,
Goodman did believe that our judgments answer to
shared local standards of inductive correctness. According
to him, the required projectibility verdicts are reached
locally in pragmatic procedures that terminate in reflective
equilibrium (see below).
Another case of projection studied by Goodman
comes to light in the analysis of the truth conditions of
counterfactual conditionals (CCs), that is, hypothetical
statements of the type “If it had been the case that A, then
it would have been the case that B.” The importance of
analyzing CCs stems from their indispensability, among
others, for causal analysis, for resolving decision-theoretic
problems (common knowledge), and for modeling rea-
soning within artificial intelligence research. Just as in pre-
diction we attempt to extrapolate from known to
unknown cases, in CCs we attempt to extrapolate from
known circumstances to hypothetical ones. Goodman’s
analysis displayed the partial dependency of such extrapo-
lations on our conceptual commitments. His example was
“If match m had been struck, then m would have lighted”;
another was “Had Julius Caesar been in command in
Korea, he would have used only nuclear bombs.” The first
step in his analysis is to regard sentences like these as being
of the form “if A, then B,” or as ordinary implications.
According to most standard semantics, the truth
value (i.e., “true” or “false”) of a given sentence is deter-
mined by the truth values of its truth-evaluable parts and
the way they are put together. This is often expressed by
saying that the truth value of the whole is a function of the
truth values of its parts and the way in which connectives
like “and” or “if-then” combine them. In particular, the
rule for a material conditional of the form “if A, then B”
is that it is false only when the if-part (“antecedent”) is
true and the then-part (“consequent”) is false. This rule
captures an intuitive rule of inference. Suppose we
hypothesize that if it rains, then the streets are wet, and
suppose that we know that it just rained where we are
standing. Were the hypothesis true, we could regard our
knowledge of the rain and the hypothesis as sufficient for
inferring that the streets are wet. However, were the streets
not wet although it rained, we would, without further
information, first regard the hypothesis as false.
This rule about the material conditional likewise
entails (somewhat less intuitively) that an implication is
always true if its antecedent is false. Given these standard
semantic assumptions, however, CCs quickly lead to 
perplexities.
The reason for this is that, usually, at least the
antecedent of a CC is a known falsehood (whence the
name “counterfactual”). Thus, according to standard
semantics, all counterfactual conditionals should be true if
their truth were determined by the ordinary truth-
function for if-then statements mentioned above and the
truth-value of the component statements alone. However,
some CCs with a given antecedent are clearly false, and
some are in conflict with others: consider “If match m had
been struck, my grandmother would have been a school-
bus” or “If Julius Caesar had been in command in Korea,
he would have used only catapults.”
Goodman observed that typical CCs can be deter-
mined as true or false only with additional (extralogical)
facts and assumptions. The needed information concerns
(a) particular facts (e.g., background conditions such as
that the match was dry, surrounded by sufficient oxygen,
struck strongly enough, that Julius Caesar was a Roman
emperor), and (b) actual regularities that are supposed to
hold between what is described in the antecedent and the
consequent, respectively (e.g., all matches struck under
the right conditions light, no Roman emperor could use
nuclear arms). To yield an interpretation, this additional
information has to be (C1) compatible with the
antecedent, and (C2) relevant in the sense that with it the
antecedent entails the consequent when neither the
antecedent nor the additional information alone would
have. Goodman called such information sets cotenable
with the antecedent. Since any false statement we posit as
antecedent in a CC is in conflict with some truths we
know, the cotenable set has to suspend some of what we
know. Conversely, such a selection amounts to a decision
in which particular facts and which actual regularities
applying to the case we are to hold fixed in the hypothet-
ical situation.
Goodman aptly called the regularities that we single
out as fixed in a given case lawlike because in effect, they
are then not only generalizations about, for example, all
known matches under given conditions, but also about
what a match is to be like under similar conditions. The
problem is to say in a general and informative way on
what basis some of the grammatically general statements
applying to the antecedent are to be selected as lawlike
Goodman Goodman
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while others are not. Again, Goodman’s analysis under-
mines hopes for the project of modeling such judgments
in a formal mechanism because cotenability judgments
themselves depend on judging what would have followed
from an information set, that is, other CCs (see the itali-
cized part of C2). Judging CCs as true at all also (via C1)
clearly requires attention to our acceptance of whole sys-
tems of other CCs. Goodman’s analysis thus shows how,
by fusing empirical {(a) and (b)} and conceptual {(C1)
and (C2)} information, cotenability judgments implicitly
articulate our priorities regarding predicate systems. This
is most obvious from the fact that typically, factual knowl-
edge alone determines no unique selection of additional
information for any given antecedent. The same if-part in
most cases makes reference to several mutually incompat-
ible sets of facts and regularities that, for all we know, sup-
port the consequent.
The pair of Caesar conditionals illustrates this. Logic,
known regularities, and the facts of the matter require
only suspending at least one part of our knowledge about
Caesar to facilitate the antecedent. While it is open
whether we stress that Caesar was a Roman or his brutal-
ity to infer either of the (incompatible) consequents, it is
clear that applying one of the regularity sets to Caesar
excludes applying the other. That is, under invariant cog-
nitive conditions, the same regularity statement can
appear, for the same antecedent, either as a law or as capa-
ble of being false in a hypothetical situation (“accidental”).
How it ultimately appears clearly depends on pragmatic
factors like our attitude to other CCs, our interests, and
the question we wish to answer. Goodman’s answer to the
obvious question how rational agreement on CCs (and
the lawlikeness of generalizations sustaining them) is pos-
sible was that, given our competence in using the lan-
guage, our empirical and theoretical knowledge, and the
available alternatives, some information sets simply are
implausible. Once again, having no formal mechanism or
global solution does not exclude having good arguments
that can locally show why some selections are more rea-
sonable than others.
Reflective Equilibrium. In both cases of projectibility
judgments, Goodman pointed to an apparent circularity.
In both cases he took certain exemplary cases (grue, Cae-
sar, the match) as a standard to correct and refine general
principles like (U) or the general constraints on cotenabil-
ity (C1) and (C2). Thus (U) is rejected as an uncondi-
tional general principle because it licenses “grue” and
“green” on the same evidence. But at the same time, the
inference to the greenness of the next or all emeralds on
the given evidence is regulated by (U) if the familiar pred-
icates are used. The circle is that we cannot judge the ade-
quacy of a fundamental rule without any reference to
accepted particular inferences, but we also cannot reason-
ably accept the relevant particular inferences as good stan-
dards without the advantage of any application of a
roughly equivalent rule. According to Goodman, this is a
“virtuous” circle; in fact, it might be better described as
the claim that judgments in inductive and counterfactual
contexts are not reducible to mechanical decision meth-
ods. Goodman consequently proposed that justifying
inductive and counterfactual inferences should be mod-
eled as the process of producing a coherent whole of
aligned empirical, normative, and theoretical beliefs
together with judgments of particular cases, aimed at
reaching a “reflective equilibrium,” as opposed to mechan-
ical, “judgment-free” models of inductive practices, the
results of such scientific deliberations are not predictable
on the basis of given formal patterns of inference alone.
Such models do not admit standpoint-free, judgment-free
ways to justify particular results of good inductive or
counterfactual reasoning, independent of actual condi-
tions of being competent in making inductive and coun-
terfactual judgments in general. Since the latter are open
ended, mechanical models are inadequate.
Nonetheless, Goodman was not a methodological
nihilist or relativist. Scientific practice is rife with cases
where it is more reasonable to discount data as abnormal,
biased, or incomplete. In such cases, theoretical knowledge
and methodological rules decide against experience. Con-
versely, Goodman’s analysis showed how persistent anom-
alies of such kinds can come to be taken as symptoms of
defective conceptual systems or methodological inadequa-
cies. According to Goodman, we always take some induc-
tive judgments for granted when assessing others, just as
we take some results of inductive reasoning (considered
judgments) for granted when judging the adequacy of a
rule with regard to other results, or when, in unproblem-
atic cases, we apparently just apply the rule to the next
case. In this way responding to changes in empirical infor-
mation can consist in revising theoretical hypotheses,
experimental results, or methodological rules whenever
there is enough “firm ground” from the remnant estab-
lished knowledge. Which way is most reasonable in each
case will depend on the available alternatives, theoretical
expertise, and experimental creativity, and is thus not
unconstrained or arbitrary. But knowing which way is
most reasonable will in any case involve the deliberative
and open-ended activity of going back and forth between
all these poles until the whole system of beliefs is reason-
ably balanced. In a classical quote, Goodman’s Fact, Fic-
tion, and Forecast puts it thus: “The process of justification
is the delicate one of making mutual adjustments between
rules and accepted inferences; and in the agreement
achieved lies the only justification needed for either.”
It is important not to confuse Goodman’s method-
ological point that this is how we can come to evaluate
evidence and principles with the different, metaphysical
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doctrine that empirical correctness depends on the coher-
ence produced by such mutual adjustments. The latter
view can lead to an epistemological relativism Goodman
never endorsed. The famous Harvard political philoso-
pher John Rawls (1971) coined the term reflective equilib-
rium for the coherent outcome of such justificatory
procedures. Under this name, the underlying model of
reasoning and justification has become central for deci-
sion and game theorists and methodologists, as well as
ethicists and political theorists.
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GORENSTEIN, DANIEL (b. Boston, Mass-
achusetts, 1 January 1923; d. Martha’s Vineyard, Massa-
chusetts, 26 August 1992), mathematics, algebra, group
theory.
Gorenstein was an American mathematician whose
main research was in the theory of finite groups, where he
focused single-mindedly on the search for simple groups.
Besides contributing major theorems himself, he mapped
out the path that would lead to the goal of a complete
classification, and became the informal leader of a dissem-
inated team which achieved that goal.
Private Life. Born and bred in Boston, Daniel Gorenstein
attended the Boston Latin School, from which he entered
Harvard College, earning his AB in 1943 and PhD in
1950. His doctoral advisor was Oscar Zariski and his the-
sis was on a problem in algebraic geometry and its foun-
dations in commutative algebra, a subject that he did not
pursue after his first published paper. He married Helen
Brav in 1947; they had four children, three girls and a boy.
In his obituary of Gorenstein (The Independent, London
1992), Michael Collins wrote “He was a short stocky
man, who applied the same muscular techniques to his
mathematics as to his tennis,” and “Gorenstein both
worked hard and played hard. […] Research was over by
lunchtime. Living in Portland Place [London] in 1972–73
must have been ideal, for he could then devote the rest of
the day to seminars and to visits to art galleries, museums,
restaurants and the theatre. He collected modern art, with
a good eye for artists yet to be recognised, and for the
value of the works of those who were.”
Career. Soon after he achieved his doctorate Gorenstein
became assistant professor at Clark University in Worces-
ter, Massachusetts. He remained there until 1964, when
he became professor at Northeastern University in
Boston. In 1969 he moved to Rutgers University, New
Brunswick, New Jersey, where he remained for the rest of
his life, serving as chairman of the mathematics depart-
ment from 1975 to 1981 and director of DIMACS, the
NSF Center for Discrete Mathematics and Computer 
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